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1.  Introduction 
The  threat of unemployment  is one of  the most  popular arguments in 
favor  of protectionism.  Although  international  trade economists  have 
dedicated  much attention  to examining  the consequences  of 
protectionist  measures  in various  situations, they have  done so far 
less  for economies  in which unemployment  exists. This  relative  absence 
of analysis  reflects,  in large part,  the difficulty  inherent  in the 
introduction  of unemployment  into economic models  in a manner both 
tractable  and consistent with microeconomic  foundations. The 
literature  that does analyze the interrelations between  international 
trade and unemployment,  does so in economies  in which  the latter 
results from the existence of rigid or slowly adjusting wages  (e.g. 
Johnson (1965), Lapan (1976), and Neary  (1982)) or from the presence 
of minimum  wages  (Brecher (1974))l. 
This paper  seeks to analyze the implications of a tariff in an 
economic  environment  in which  the existence of incomplete markets 
under uncertainty  leads agents  to recur to the factor market, via 
implicit  contracts,  as a way of providing partial  insurance against 
income instability. As demonstrated by the implicit contracts 
literature, unemployment  is then a possibility  in some states of 
nature. 
1  A significant exception  is Matusz  (1985, 1986). 2 
As a theory of unemployment  implicit  contract  theory, of course, 
has  its shortcomings.  As Akerlof and Miyazaki  (1980) ahow, 
unemployment  results only when  the marginal  revenue product  of labor, 
evaluated  at full employment,  is less than the reservation utility  of 
a worker. More sophisticated  models, however,  that allow for asymmetry 
in information,  risk aversion on the part of the firm, and require 
contracts  to be incentive compatible are able to generate unemployment 
under conditions  in which the above inequality is reversed  (e.g. 
Grossman and Hart  (1983), Azariadis  (1983)). Overall,  the main 
contribution  of implicit contract  theory 
— the  perception  of 
employment  and wage—setting  as a long term relation  that  involves  risk 
sharing — seems  a  valuable  one  whose  consequences  deserve  to  be 
explored. 
Although  trade under uncertainty has  itself been the subject of 
several recent studies,  these have primarily  focused on the relevanre 
of the basic theorems  of international  trade either in the absence of 
any risk sharing mechanisms  or under  the assumption  that solely 
international risk  sharing through international  trade in equities  is 
possible.  Thus Newbery and Stiglitz  (1984) demonstrate,  by means  of on 
example,  the possibility  of Pareto inferior  trade in an economy  in 
which risk sharing is inexistent and Helpman  and Razin (1978) 
establish  the standard  results of the Heckscher—Ohlin—Saiuuelson model 
in a stock market model in which  international  trade in equities  is 
permitted. 
With the notable exceptions of Ethier (1982, 1985) and Matusz 
(1985, 1986), however,  the possibility  of agents providing  insurance 
by entering  into implicit contracts  has been  ignored by trade 3 
theorists.  Ethier uses  the basic result of the simplest contract  modei 
— state  invariant wages — as  a framework  in which  to explain dumping 
and the employment  of migrant labor. Matusz examines  the validity  of 
the fundamental  theorems  of the Heckscher—Ohlin—Samuelson  model with 
implicit  contracts  and the welfare and employment  effects of trade in 
a Ricardian  model with implicit contracts. 
Matuszs  analysis  assumes (as does all the implicit  contract 
literature  to my knowledge)  that there is no aggregate uncertainty  in 
the economy.  Uncertainty  results from iid technological  shocks  to 
individual  firms that enter  the production  function  in a 
multiplicative  fashion. Consequently  all aggregate variables  are non— 
stochastic.  International  trade is not in itself a cause of 
unemployment  but may, by changing  relative prices,  influence  its size. 
In contrast,  the analysis undertaken here  assumes that uncertainty  is 
a product  of fluctuations in the terms of trade and hence  is aggregate 
and a consequence  of the openness  of the economy.  Furthermore,  in 
contrast  with  the standard partial equilibrium  treatment of implicit 
labor contracts,  the level of agents' expected utility and expected 
profits  is endogenously  determined.2 
Several questions  are suggested by this approach.  It is of 
interest  to examine how the implicit  contract  determines  factor prices 
and employment  as a function of the terms of trade. This  leads to an 
understanding  of how income is divided among agents in "good" versus 
"bad" times. A  next step is to ask how a tariff, imposed after the 
2An exception  is Horn and Svensson  (1986) who use a  general 
equilibrium  model of implicit  contracts  to analyze optimal  labor 
contracts  in the presence  of trade unions. 4 
international  terns of trade are known, affects the distribution  of 
income and the level of employment within the economy. An important 
question  is whether  tariffs may constitute a Pareto improvement  over 
free trade. That is,  to the extent that import relief legislation 
manifests  a social desire to provide insurance,  is a tariff an 
efficient  instrument  for doing 
Independently  of any threat of unemployment,  an important  argument 
for protection  is that commercial  policy is able to play a role  in 
providing  in  trance when  domestic  markets are incomplete.  (This 
argument  is especially  important  in the context of developing 
economies where market  incompleteness  is thought to be more 
prevalent.)  Eaton and Grossman  (1985) show, for example,  that in a 
sector—specific  economy with  no risk sharing mechanisms  a marginal 
tariff at free trade may increase social welfare.  The question  then 
arises, however,  whether  a tariff may constitute  a Pareto improvement 
over free trade in an environment  in which some form of domestic 
insurance  — in this case implicit contracts  — exists. 
2.  The Model 
Consider  a small open economy that produces  two goods  (X1 and X2) 
with one factor of production,  labor (L). Technology  in each sector,  F 
and 0, is assumed to be quasi—concave,  twice differentiable,  with 
F(O)—C(O)—O  and F'(O)—G'(O)—..  To simplify notation  assume  that there 
is only one firm in each sector. The economy  is populated  by two typee 
3For example,  article XIX of the GATT and section 201 of the U.S. 
Trade Act of 1974 allow tariff concessions  (reductions) to be 
withdrawn  if a product  is imported  in such quantities  so as to cause 
serious  injury to domestic  producers. S 
of agents characterized by their objectives,  endowments,  and attitudes 
towards risk: entrepreneurs  own firms and maximize  expected  profits 
and 1 risk—averse workers  own their labor and maximize  expected 
utility.4  Reflecting  the assumption that firms make some sort of firm 
specific  investment  in their workers,  labor is assumed to be ex ante 
mobile and ex post immobile,  i.e. once employed  in a firm labor is, 
for at least the short to medium—run time interval  considered here, 
firm specific. Workers possess identical utility functions  and 
identical  i'divisible endowments  of labor. 
As a result of,  for example, an uncertain  degree of import 
competition  for good X1,  the economy faces uncertainty  in the terms of 
trade. So that, letting X2 be the numeraire of the economy  and P be 
the  relative  price of X1 in terms of X2,  P is a random variable  that 
fluctuates between ￿PP. As has been shown by the implicit  contracts 
literature, given the above risk preference  assumptions  it  is mutually 
advantageous  under uncertainty  for entrepreneurs and workers to 
formulate a 'contract" specifying the employment  level of and the 
income to be paid to workers  in each state of nature  (where each 
realization  of P, p, is associated with a different  state of nature).D 
This enables workers to trade—off some of the income instability which 
they are subject to as a consequence of a fluctuating  marginal  revenue 
product  in a full employment,  perfectly competitive  environment  and 
'. Entrepreneurs  are  assumed to be endowed  with  a sufficient 
quantity  of good X2 so as to prevent bankruptcy  in any state of 
nature. 
The clasic  references are Azariadis  (1975), Baily  (1974), and 
Gordon (1974). The implicit  contracts literature has been reviewed 
recently by Rosen (1985) and Hart and Holmstrom  (1986). 6 
permits  the risk—neutral  entrepreneur to lower the expected wage bill. 
Hence, assuniing  that entrepreneurs  and workers know the probabillty 
distribution  h(p) of P, both parties will enter  into an implicit 
contract. 
Prior to the realization of the state of nature  the firm decides 
the quantity  of workers,  N, with which it wishes  to contract  given the 
market  level of expected  utility, U, that each contracted  worker must 
receive.  Those workers  are then offered a contract  of the form 
c..(ej.wi) 
where  i—l,2 denotes the sector to which the firm belongs, 
is the probability  of a contracted worker being employed  in state 
p, and w1 
is the wage  offered in that state.  Workers either work, 
contributing  their total endowment of labor, and enjoy  indirect 
utility V(w,p), or are unemployed with utility . The  latter can be 
interpreted  as the utility derived from the leisure available when 
unemployed  or from a state—invariant  non—tradable  consumption basket 
of goods obtained  by home production during unemployment.  I assume, as 
in Azariadis  (1975), that firms cannot offer workers unemployment 
insurance.6  Furthermore,  contracts are assumed to be incentive 
compatible  so that entrepreneurs  are restricted  to wages  such that 
V(.)￿U 
6 This assumption  ensures that we are in a second best world. 
Large transactions  costs or some form of moral  hazard  is needed to 
justify  it. 
It is assumed throughout  the analysis  that this constraint  is 
not binding. 7 
Consider  the maximization  problem faced by the firm in the sector 
that produces  the imported good, X1.8 The  firm's objective  is to 
maximize  expected  profit subject to an expected utility  constraint  and 
an employment  constraint. Thus,  the firm solves: 




+ Ô(l—e))dH￿i  (1) 
l￿e,  Vp 
where 
H(P)=.J'h(p)dP,  N1 is the number of workers contracted with in 
sector one, and LNe is the number of workers actually  employed  in 
state p.9 
The first constraint  ensures that workers receive  expected utility 
equal to the competitive  level. The utility of a worker conditional  on 
state p is the sum of the utility obtained when  employed,  weighted  by 
the probability  of employment,  and the utility derived  when 
unemployed,  weighted  by the probability of unemployment.  The second 
continuum  of constraints  guarantee  that the firm does not hire more 
workers,  in any state of nature, than the total labor pool with which 
it contrac'ed. 
The  first order conditions  (foc)  with respect to w,  e,  and N1 
derived from  (1)  are: 
8  It is assumed that for the given range of P, X1 is always 
imported  and X2 exported.  Furthermore, it is implicitly  assumed that 
entrepreneurs  consume only the numeraire  good. 
For notational  convenience  subscripts  i and p are omitted 
wherever  their presence  is not required  for clarity. 8 
(i). V—N/A 




and the Kuhn—Tucker  conditions: 
l—eO,  i(l—e)—O 
(3) 
where A is the Lagrange multiplier  associated with the first 
constraint  and 
yp 
the Lagrange multiplier  associated with the second 
constraint  in state p.) 
The first foc determines  optimal risk  sharing between workers  and 
entrepreneurs  and requires the marginal  utility of the wage  to be 
constant  over all  states of nature. The second requires  the cost of a 
marginal  reduction  in the probability of employment,  pFLN-t-A(V—U), 
to exceed  or equal the benefit, wN. The  first term,  PFLN, measures  the 
value  of the loss in output resulting  from a  marginal  decrease  in e. 
The term A(V—U) is the amoumt by which the wage bill would  have  to be 
increased  in order to restore workers to the same level of utility  as 
prior to the decrease  in the probability  of employment,  i.e. — 
Nedw/delu  where TJ(p)—Ve+U(1—e).  Note that dw/delu is multiplied  by 
Ne reflecting  the fact that all employed  workers must receive  the 
increased wage. An implication of (2—u)  is that when the solution  is 
interior  (i.e.  when there is unemployment),  the wage  is greater  than 
the value  of the marginal product of labor. A reversal of this 
inequality  is feasible  only in the corner solution  (i.e.  at full 
employment). 9 
The  third foc determines  the optimal quantity of workers that  the 
firm should contract. It requires  the expected  benefit from a marginal 
increase  in the quantity  of contracted workers 
JPFLedI-i, 
to equal the expected cost, 
JwedkI. 
e appears in 
both terms since a contracted  worker is not necessarily  an employed 
worker  and hence  the probability  of employment  is the relevant 
variable  in calculating expected  cost and benefit. 
The maximization  problem of the firm in the export sector is 
identical  to (1)  with p replaced by  1 and F by C.  The first order 
conditions  follow as in  (2)  with the corresponding  modifications. 
Equilibrium  is attained  in the economy at  when all workers 
receive a contract  from one of the two sectors of the economy so that 
and  il2,  or the utility from a contract  is 
and EN￿2.  (Ex ante mobility  of workers ensures that the expected 
utility of contracting with either sector is equal in equilibrium.) 
Existence  and uniqueness  of equilibrium  follows from (i)  a  perfecdy 
inelastic  supply curve of labor for t￿ii and  (ii) a  downward  sloping 
demand  curve for labor. Appendix  I  proves  that the number of workers 
that a firm wishes  to contract  with is a negative  function of U. 
Equilibrium  in the labor market is depicted  in Figure 1. It is 
assumed  throughout the analysis  that the equilibrium attained  is such 
that  and hence that all workers receive a contract. 10 
3.  Characterization  of the Contracts 
This section analyzes  the income distributional  and welfare 
consequences  of different states of nature. That is,  it examines  the 
effect on wages, profits,  and on different  agents' welfare  of states 
of nature  in which the terms of trade are relatively higher  or lower. 
Note that this analysis differs  from that obtained by asking  how the 
contract  itself would change if the distribution  of prices had,  for 
example,  a higher mean or a lower variance;  we are inquiring  about 
movements  along a given contract.  While  of interest in its own right, 
this will also prove helpful when  examining  the question  of whether  a 
tariff may constitute a Pareto improvement over free trade. 
Note  that the constancy  of the marginal  utility of the wage 
required by (2—i) cannot be interpreted as implying a state—invariant 
wage rate since changes in the relative  price of  affect the 




It is assumed that V<O. The sign of V 
is derived by 
differentiating  Roy's  identity 
V—GV 
(5) 
with  respect  to w (where C is the amount of good  X1 consumed  by an 




is the coefficient of relative risk  aversion  and 
.-(ac/aw).(w/c)  is the income elasticity  of demand for X1. Therefore, 
dw/dp_C(R*4)/R*  (7) 11 
Thus  the sign of  (7)  depends on the relative  magnitudes  of R* and . 
(If,  for example, homothetic  preferences  are assumed, dw/dp￿O  as 
R*￿l.) 
Assuming  that the distribution of the terms of trade is such  that 
full employment  obtains for some states of nature and unemployment  for 
others,  the import sector will be at full employment  at the higher 
realizations  of P and the export sector at the lower realizations.  In 
neither sector is the transition from full employment  to unemployment 
discontinuous;  as p changes gradually,  the level of employment  does 
not  jump downwards when unemployment obtains.  Since all functions  in 
(2—fl) are continuous  in p,  a downward jump of employment  (implying an 
upward jump  in FL) would require an upward jump  in 
Yp 
and hence 7>O 
which is incompatible with the Kuhn—Tucker  condition  for unemployment. 
The effect of a marginal  increase in p on employment  in the import 
sector when unemployment  exists is derived by differentiating  (2—li) 
with respect  to p and using Roy's identity, yielding: 
dL1/dp— —(FL—Cl)/pFLL  (8) 
the sign of which depends on the magnitude  of consumption  of good X1 
by an employed  worker  in sector one relative  to the marginal  product 
of labor in that sector. Throughout the analysis  it shall be assumed 
that 
FL>Cl  (9) 
so that employment  is an increasing function of the terms of trade. 
The ambiguity  in (8)  can be understood  in the following  fashion. 
(2—u)  states that when unemployment exists, the cost to the firm of a 
marginal  decrease  in the probability  of employment  should equal the 
marginal benefit. A  marginal  increase in p increases  this cost by FL 12 
thus creating  an incentive  to increase e and hence employment  in that 
state of nature. It also, however,  increases the narginal benefit  of 
lowering  e by C1 since the  increased price of good X1 implies that 
employment  in that state of nature is less attractive  and hence  that 
the firm's wage compensation  to workers for a lower employment 
probability  is smaller,  i.e. dw/dpluC. If the increase  in marginal 
benefit is greater than the increase in marginal  cost,  the firm should 
decrease  the quantity  of labor hired, thus obtaining  the  "counter— 
intuitive'  result that employment is,  for some range of the terms of 
trade, a decreasing  function of p. 
In the export sector, differentiation of (2—u)  yields: 
dL2/dpC2/GLL  (10) 
so that employment  is a  decreasing  function of p. 
The behavior  of employment  in both sectors as a function  of the 
terms of trade is shown in Figure 2. 
The effect of a marginal  price increase on profits  in sector one 
depends on the status of employment in that sector. Differentiating 
the profit function with respect to p and using (7)  obtains: 
dlrl/dp=(pFL_wl)dLl/dp + F—C1L1  + I1C1L1/R1*  (11) 
Noting  that  (9)  implies that F>C1L1, it follows that when in the range 
of prices in which sector one has full employment a marginal  increase 
in p causes sector one profits  to increase. When the economy  has 
unemployment,  dL1/dp>O,  so that a  marginal  increase  in p has  an 
ambiguous  effect on profits. 
In the export sector  (sector 2),  differentiation  of the profit 
function  with respect to p yields: 
d7r2/dp(CL—w2)dL2/dp 
— 
C2L2  +  ,112C2L2/R2*  (12) 13 
indicating  that under full employment profits move  in the opposite 
direction  to the wage  and that with unemployment  profits may  increase 
or decrease  with the terms of trade. 
The  effect of slightly higher realizations of P on the conditional 
utility of workers  in sector one, U1(p), 
U1(p)=V(w1,p)e  + (l—e)  (13) 
likewise depends  on whether  the sector is at full employment. 
Differentiating  (13) and using  (7) yields 
dU1/dp=  _(VwlClel)/Rl*  + [(V—)/N1].dL1/dp  (14) 
so that under  full employment  workers' conditional  utility is a 
decreasing  function of p. Equation  (14)  makes it clear that, although 
it  is not possible  to sign (7), the effect on V(w,p) of a  higher 
[lower] realization  of P and the associated wage change warranted  by 
the contract  is negative  [positive]  .  This  is a consequence  of the 
optimal risk sharing condition which requires  the marginal  utility of 
income to be constant  over states of nature. 
With unemployment  the sign  of  (14)  is ambiguous  since it depends 
on whether  the net negative  effect of a price increase—wage  change on 
utility  outweighs  the positive  effect on utility  of an increase in 
the probability  of employment.  Although  (11) and  (14) cannot be 
unambiguously  signed when  unemployment  exists, multiplication  of (11) 
by V/N  and recalling  from  (2—u) that 
PFL_w__(V_U)/Vw  yields: 
(Vu/Ni)•  dir1/dp—dU1/dp + (F_ClLl)Vw/Nl (15) 
indicating  that, given a price increase, profits necessarily  increase 
if workers' utility  falls and that workers' utility  increases if 
profits fall. Therefore,  it is impossible  for a price  increase to 
simultaneously  make both  parties  to the contract worse  off. 
Alternatively,  a price decrease  cannot make both  oarties better off 14 
Setting expression  (14) equal to zero  it is possible  to solve for 
the income transfer  (dv1) that sector one workers would require in 
order to be just as well off as prior to the price change. 
— [(V_)/Vw]dLi/dP)dp  (16) 
where  (14) has previously  been multiplied by N1 to include the effect 
of the price change on the conditional utility  of all workers  in 
sector one. Note, however,  that dv1 is multiplied  by L1 respecting  the 
restriction  that only employed workers may receive income transfers. 
Setting  (11) equal to zero yields the transfer  (dz1) required by 
entrepreneurs  in sector one to keep profits constant 
dzl=_j(pFL_w)dLl/dp 
+ F—C1L1  + 1C1L1/R1*)dp  (17) 
Hence, 
L1dv1/dp-fdz1/dp1—--(F—C1L1) 
<0  (18) 
Thus, if compensation  is allowed,  agents in sector one would  prefer  a 
higher  to a lower price  for good X1. 
The conditional utility of workers in sector two, however, 
unambiguously  decreases with a price increase  regardless  of  the  status 
of employment 
dU2/dp= _(Vw,2C2e2)/R2*  + [(V—U)/N2].dL2/dp  (19) 
since, unlike  the case for sector one workers,  the probability  of 
eniploymerit is a decreasing  function of p. 
Performing  the same compensation  exercise as for sector one agents 
yields: 
L2dv2.{c,2C2L2)/R2* 




C2L2 + tI,2C2L2/R2*)  (21) 
Hence, 15 
L2dv2/dp+dz2/dp=C2L2>O  (22) 
so  that, if compensation  is allowed,  agents in sector  two would prefer 
a lower to a higher price  for X1. 
The results derived  in this section differ from  those of Jones 
(1971) sector—specific  model or the Heckscher—Ohlin—Samuelson  model. 
Under  full employment  in both sectors the economy behaves more  along 
the lines predicted  by the Stolper—Samuelson  theorem. A  price  increase 
pits  all workers  against sector one entrepreneurs;  the position  of 
sector two entrepreneurs  is ambiguous. When there is unemployment  in 
least one sector of the economy, however,  various combinations  of 
agents gaining and  losing are possible  including outcomes with the 
flavor of the sector—specific  model in which all agents in sector one 
favor the price  increase and those in sector  two are opposed. 
4. Welfare Analysis  of a Tariff 
This  section analyzes  the question of whether a tariff can 
constitute  a Pareto improvement over free trade. The  tariff examined 
is imposed by the government after the state of nature  is known but 
before  firms have made  their decision  as to the particular  identity of 
the workers  to be hired or laid off. This  reflects  the assumption  that 
the government  is unable to make state contingent  transfers, otherwise 
the economy could simply proceed to the first best  by allowing  the 
government  to play any viable  insurance role. 
The tariff is unanticipated.  This case  is of interest because the 
government  cannot make state contingent plans and, moreover,  ex ante 
policies would tend to be time inconsistent. Thus  the scenario is one 
in which  the government knows  the unemployment  that will  result (if 16 
any) under  the particular  state of nature that has been realized, and 
may choose to impose a tariff. 
The  imposition of a tariff implies that firms and workers alter 
the original wage—employment  decision to that determined  by  the 
contract  for the state of nature corresponding  to the tariff inclusive 
price. That  is,  it is as if the contract had been written with the 
states of nature given by the domestic price level p_p*(l+t), where  p' 
denotes the free trade relative price of good X1,  so that a tariff, as 
far as the contract  is concerned, merely moves the economy to a stats 
of nature corresponding  to higher realizations of p* 
The possibility  of a tariff improving welfare appears more likeiy 
when the economy has unemployment  in sector one and full employment  in 
sector two since in this situation a small tariff unambiguously 
increases  employment  and the value of output at free trade prices. 
To analyze whether  in this situation a tariff is capable of 
permitting  a Pareto improvement over free trade, we examine the set sf 
constrained  Pareto optima described by the solutions  to 
Max £=V(w1+s1/L1,  p*(l+tflL1  + (N1—L1)  +  (23) 
p1(V(w2+s2/N2,  p*(l+t))}N2 + p2(G—w2N2+s3)  + 
[*(l+t)  F—w1L1—s1—s2—s3+TJ 
for values  of p1￿O,  i—l,2,3. Different choices for the values of 
correspond  to different points on the utility—possibility  frontiet. 
N2—1—N1,  5s.  is a lump sum transfer of income to employed  workers in 
sector  i,  i=l,2 or to entrepreneurs  in sector two, i—3, and T is the 
tariff  revenue. 
Note  that the formulation  of (23) assumes that the government  is 
able  to engage  in lump—sum  transfers of income among employed  workers 17 
and entrepreneurs  but not  to unemployed workers.  This respects  the 
initial restriction faced by entrepreneurs  prohibiting  them from 
providing  unemployed workers with  insurance. Insofar as the government 
is forced to respect the same restrictions as entrepreneurs,  this 
avoids one of critiques of this literature  in that the government's 
conduct  of trade policy  is not ad hoc assumed to be free of the 
constraints  faced by the private market.1° 
The  foc for  this problem are: 
3f/as1V1 
+ 3[—l+dT/ds1] =0 
8f/8s2=i1V2 
+ 3[—1+dT/ds2]  —0 
3C/3s3=p2  + /23[—l+dT/ds3  =0  (24) 
a/at=vy1[dw1/dt_c1p*_s1/L12.dL1/dt]L1 
+ (V1—ii)dL1/dt + 
1V2[dw2/dt_C2p*] 
+ p2[N2dw2/dt]  + 
,LL3 
[ (pFL_wl)dLl/dt+p*F_Lldwl/dt+dT/dt]  =0 
Differentiation  of T_tp*(C1L1+C2N2_F)  yields: 
aT/as_tp*3c/3y i—l,2 and 8T/3s3—0  (25) 
It can easily be shown  that the free trade equilibrium  (t—s10) 
fulfills  the necessary  conditions  for a  constrained  Pareto optimum. 
Noting  that aT/3sIo—0 yields: 
V1—V—j—j 
(26) 
Hence, using Roy's  identity obtains: 
af/atI  t_si=oyl(_P* dT/dt  t_si_oPFL  1)dL1/dt + 
[(V1_vi)/V1]dL1/dt) 
(27) 
10See Dixit  (1986) for this and related criticism  of trade policy 
in the context of incomplete markets. 18 
where  I is the quantity  imported of X1.  Differentiation  of T with 
respect to the tariff rate yields: 
dT/dtI5o  (*1  + tp*([8C1/3y1.(dw1/dt)+(8C1/ap).p*1L1 
+  (28) 
[3C2/3y2.  (8w2/Bt)+(8C2/ap)p*}N2 — (FL—Cl)dLl/dt) 
Hence, 




Noti  g that y1j5_=0=w1 and recalling  from  (2—li) that pFL_wl 
= 
_(Vl_U)/Vw1 when  unemployment  exists, this implies 
df/dtI5o  0  (31) 
(Proof that t=s=0 is a local maximum  is presented  in Appendix  II.) 
The preceding  analysis permits us to conclude  that free trade is a 
constrained  Pareto optimum and hence  that a small tariff at free  trade 
cannot be Pareto improving. The intuition behind this result is as 
follows:  In many models  of incomplete markets  (e.g.  Stiglitz 
(l982a,.4) the constrained suboptimality  of the competitive 
equilibrium  follows from the fact that competitive  agents do not  take 
into account the effect of their actions on the distribution of prices 
in the economy.  In these environments prices play a dual role:  they 
simultaneously  allocate  goods and distribute  risk among agents.  Since 
the public  good nature  of prices is not taken into consideration  by 
agents, the competitive  market generally will not induce the optimal 
distribution  of risk and a set of taxes may be Pareto improving. 
This role for taxes is not  available in the present context. 
Contracts  have already been written  in such a way as to provide  the 
risk—averse  agents with the optimal amount of insurance, i.e. the 19 
marginal  utility of the wage is constant over  states of nature, and 
the underlying  distribution of prices is exogenous  and hence cannot h 
changed  by government policy. Thus  the effect of the tariff is simply 
to move  agents along the preestablished  contract  and to make availabl 
the associated  tariff revenue. 
Yet  another insightinto why a tariff is not Pareto improving  may 
be  derived  from the theory of the second—best. The implicit  contract, 
as its construction  indicates, is optimal given the restrictions 
imposed,  i.e.  ,  g  ien  the inability of entrepreneurs  to insure 
unemployed  workers.  The production  inefficiency  inherent in the 
contract  is an outcome of this restriction. The imposition  of a 
tariff, however,  does not create an additional  market by which to 
bypass  this restriction and it introduces an additional  consumption 
inefficiency.  Consequently,  it is not to be expected  that a tariff ma 
be Pareto improving  in this economy. 
5.  Concluding  Remarks 
This paper examines  the effect of a tariff in an economy with 
implicit  contracts.  The optimal contract  is characterized and wages 
and employment  are shown to differ  in important ways  from that 
predicted  by standard models. Furthermore,  it is shown that a tariff 
cannot constitute  a Pareto improvement over  free trade. 
Several directions  for further research are suggested  by this 
approach.  Most important  is the role of an anticipated  tariff  or stat 
contingent  trade policy  on the part of the government, assuming  that 
pre—commitment  is feasible. This would, of course, affect the form of 
the contract  itself. Another area to explore involves more 20 
sophisticated  contract models  in which the reasons for  the second best 
nature of the contract  is more firmly grounded  in microeconomic 
theory, e.g. moral hazard stemming  from asymmetric information. 21 
APPENDIX  I 
(2)  and  (3)  determine  N as a function of U.  Differentiation  of 
(2—i) yields 
dw/dU—A.[dN/dU  — (dA/dU)N/A]  (Al) 
where 
A=(U.A)<O  (A2) 
Differentiating  the  Kuhn—Tucker conditions  shows that, given full 
employment  de/dTJ='O  and that with unemployment  d-Y/dU=O. Hence, 
differentiation  of (2—ti) when unemployment  exists yields 
de/dU-BdN/dU—DdA/dU  (A3) 
where 
B=[w—pFL—pFLLeN]/[pN2FLL]<O  and D=(V—)/(pN2FLL)<O  (A4) 
Differentiating  (2—ui), substituting  (Al) and  (A3)  where 
appropriate,  and recalling  the Kuhn—Tucker  conditions obtains,  after 
some manipulation, 










indicates  integration only over  those states of nature  in 
which unemployment  exists and J 
only over those states of nature 
employment  (dH has been  omitted throughout). 
A similar procedure  for the equation  defining  expected utility, 22 
f(V(w,p)e 
+ (—e)}IU,  yields: 
JdX/dU + KdN/dU1  (A?) 
where 
>0  and 
K_f(V_U)B+SVeA 
<0  (A8) 
Using (A5) to solve for dA/du and substituting  into  (A7) yields: 
dN/dIJ(E.K—J.I)—E  (A9) 
so that sign dN/dU  — signIE.K—J.I). Manipulating  (A9) yields  sign 
(E.K—Jfl>0 and hence dN/dU<0 23 
APPENDIX  II 
Proof that the free trade equilibrium  is a local maximum for  (23) 
follows. 
(i). a2f/at250  Vyl(p*2[(ôhl/dp).Ll+(8h2/dp).N2]  + pFLL(dLl/dt) 
+ (c2/3y2).2C2L2/R2])N2<O 
where  ah1/ap is  the substitution term in the Slutsky equation. 
(ii). 32c/at2.a2[/as12—(a2f/atas1)2I5o— 
V11V1/L1.  {p*2[(3h1/dp).L1+(3h2/dp).N2]  + pFLL(dLl/dt)2 
— 
P*2[8C/a)CL/R] )>O. 
(iii). The third principal  minor yields: 
+ 
pFLL(dLl/dt)2)<O. 












































Akerlof,G.  and Miyazaki,H  "The implicit contract  theory of 
unemployment meets the wage bill argument," Review  of Economic 
Studies,  1980,  47,  321—38. 
Azariadis,  Costas, "Implicit contracts and underemployment 
equilibria," Journal of Political  Economy, Dec. 1975, 83,  1183—1202. 
Employment with  Asymmetric  Information," Quarterly  Journal 
of Economics,  1983,  98,  157—73. 
Baily, Martin H  .,"Wages and employment under uncertain demand,' 
Review of Economic Studies,  1974,  41,  37—50. 
Brecher, Richard,  "Minimum wage rates amd the pure  theory of 
international  trade," Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1974, 88,  98— 
Dixit, Avinash,  "Trade and insurance with moral hazard," mimeo, 
Princeton University, October 1986. 
Eaton, Jonathan and Gene M. Grossman, "Tariffs as insurance:  optimal 
commercial  policy when domestic markets are incomplete," Canadian 
Journal of Economics, May 1985, 18,  258—272. 
Ethier, Wilfred,  "Dumping," Journal of Political Economy,  1982,  90. 
487—506. 
".  "International trade and labor migration," American  Economic 
Review, Sept. 1985,  75,  691—707. 
Gordon, Donald F.,  "A neoclassical  theory of Keynesian  unemployment," 
Economic  Inquiry,  1974,  12,  431—59. 
Grossman,  Sanford and Oliver Hart,  "Implicit contracts  under 
asymmetrical  information,"  Quarterly Journal of Economics,  1983, 71, 
123—57. 25 
Hart, Oliver and Bengt Hoinstrom,  "The Theory of Contracts,"  in 
Advances in Economic Theory, ed.  Truman  Bewley, Cambridge 
University  Press, forthcoming. 
Helpnan,  Elhanan and Assaf Razin, "Uncertainty and international 
trade in the presence of stock markets," Review of Economic  Studies, 
1978, 45,  239—50. 
Horn, Henrik and Lars E.O. Svensson, "Trade unions and optimal labor 
contracts,"  Economic Journal, June 1986, 96,  323—41. 
Johnson,  Harry G.,  "Optimal trade intervention in the presence  of 
domestic  distortions,"  in Trade, Growth, and the Balance of Payments 
(ed.  R. Caves, H. Johnson,  and P. Kenen) Chicago: Rand Mcnally and 
Co., 1965. 
Jones, Ronald,  "A three factor model in theory, trade and history,"  in 
J.N.  Bhagwati  et al., eds.,  Trade, Balance of Payments  and Crowth, 
Amsterdam:  North Holland,  1971. 
Lapan, Harvey, International trade, factor market distortions  and  the 
optimal subsidy," American Economic Review, 1976, 66,  335—46. 
Matuss, Steven, "The Heckscher—Ohlin—Samuelson  model with implicit 
contracts,"  Quarterly Journal of Economics. Nov. 1985, 1313—1329. 
", "Implicit Contracts, unemployment and international  trade, 
Quarterly  Journal of Economics, June 1986, 96,  307—322. 
Neary, Peter J.,  "International capital mobility, wage  stickiness, and 
the case of adjustment assistance," in Import Competition  and 
Response,  ed. J.N. Bhagwati,  Chicago: The University  of Chicago Press. 
Newbery,  D.M.G. and Joseph E.  Stiglitz, "Pareto Inferior Trade," 
Review  of Economic  Studies, 1984, 51,  1—13. 
Rosen,  Sherwin,  "Implicit contracts," Journal of Economic Literature, Sept. 1985, 1144—1175. 
26 